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Abstract
We compare Europe with the USA and Canada as regards business cycle synchronization
and core-periphery patterns. A long sample (1950-2005) makes it possible to study how these
aspects have evolved over time. Results support the economic viability of EMU. Average
cyclical correlations among European countries have risen significantly, reaching levels close
to, or even higher than, those of North American regions. Applying fuzzy clustering to the
analysis of core-periphery issues, we find Europe to actually outperform North America: the
core-periphery divide is milder, and peripheral status seems generally less protracted.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies how Europe compares with two other currency areas - the USA and Canada
- from the viewpoint of the prevalence of asymmetric shocks. Drawing on annual data starting
in 1950, we analyze the degree of business cycle synchronization among the members of each of
the three areas, and how it has evolved over time.1 We also consider whether cyclical develop-
ments have tended to conform to a core-periphery pattern, with an economically large subset of
regions (the "core") closely aligned among themselves, and whether some regions are particularly
vulnerable to finding themselves in a peripheral situation.
The literature has generally taken the USA as the benchmark of an optimum (or at least work-
able) currency area, against which Europe has been assessed with unfavorable results. Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1993) make a comparison for the period 1960-1988 between the then 12 Euro-
pean Union (EU) member countries and 8 USA regions. For output growth, inflation, and supply
and demand structural disturbances, they find that correlations with anchor areas (Germany and
the Mid-East) were generally higher in the USA than in Europe. Wynne and Koo (2000) compare
business cycles in the pre-2004 15 EU members (EU-15 in the remainder) with those in the twelve
Federal Reserve Districts. With annual data for the period 1963-1992, they document that pair-
wise output gap correlations are clearly higher in the USA than in Europe. However, the authors
suggest that cyclical synchronization may be increasing in the latter, as extending the European
sample back to the 1950s would tend to decrease correlation coefficients. Clark and van Wincoop
(2001) also compare bilateral correlations of the business cycle component of aggregate output in
14 EU countries (EU-15 minus Luxemburg) and 9 USA Census regions, drawing on annual data
from 1963 to 1997. They formally test whether the average pairwise correlation among American
regions is significantly higher than the corresponding figure for European countries - the so-called
border effect, as the former group, unlike the latter, are not separated by national borders. A
large and significant border effect indeed exists, decreasing only marginally (from 0.28 to 0.24)
from the first to the second half of the sample.
Studies focussing on regional cyclical co-movements in a single monetary union are much more
numerous. As those in the previous paragraph, they often take into account that the degree of
business cycle synchronization may change over time, in line with the argument that the criteria
defining an optimum currency area (OCA) are endogenous (Frankel and Rose, 1998). Tootell
(1990) applied the theory of OCAs to three levels of regional detail in the USA, analyzed cyclical
correlations and found that some regions would probably be better off having their own currencies.
Carlino and Sill (1997, 2000), using quarterly data for personal income, report that business cycle
correlations are quite different across regions, although they still find a core group - the Eastern
part of the USA. Partridge and Rickman (2005), using time series for USA state employment,
find a decline in regional correlations over time (the analyzed period is 1971-98), associated to a
decline in the volatility of business cycles. Beine and Coulombe (2003) use quarterly data between
1961 and 2001 to study cyclical correlations between the provinces of Canada and the USA. They
find that Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia would benefit from joining the US dollar.
As for Europe, there is a huge and fast-expanding literature investigating whether national
business cycle affiliations have changed in the wake of the major milestones in European monetary
1 In the remainder, the territorial units forming a monetary union will be generically designated by "members"
or "regions", be they Canadian provinces, American states or Census regions, or European countries. Further,
Europe will often be referred to as a monetary union, although the euro only came into existence in the final years
of our sample, and has not been adopted by all the countries under study. In some instances, the analysis will be
explicitly circumscribed to euro area members.
integration - the inception of the Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary
System (EMS) and the move to a single currency. Artis and Zhang (1997) find evidence of
stronger cyclical correlation between European economies after the start of the ERM, with most
participating countries shifting their cyclical affiliations from the USA to Germany. Perez et al.
(2007), using rolling window contemporaneous and maximum (lead/lag) correlations, report an
increase in business cycle correlations of EMU countries with Germany, though it also holds that
the American cycle has led European countries’ cycles by one to two quarters, especially since 1993.
Angeloni and Dedola (1999) report that cyclical correlations of European countries with Germany
increased in the pre-EMU years (1993-1997) relative to previous periods, especially 1986-1992.
Artis et al. (2004) find some evidence for the existence of a common European business cycle
for 8 countries, except partially for the case of the UK. Gayer (2007) concludes that since 1999
average bilateral correlations among euro area countries have essentially stabilized at the high
level attained in the first half of the nineties. Other studies, however, cast doubt on the existence
of a European business cycle. For instance, Inklaar and de Haan (2001) report a decrease in
business cycle synchronization of countries belonging to the EMS with the German economy since
the 1970s. Camacho et al. (2006) fail to find evidence of the existence of a common driving force
or attractor in European countries’ business cycles. Mink et al. (2007) conclude that business
cycle synchronization and co-movement for the euro area do not exhibit a clear upward trend in
the 1970-2005 period, and that national business cycles are still significantly different.
This paper also looks at core-periphery patterns in cyclical co-movements. Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1993) raised this issue, and suggested that there was a core of countries in the
European Union (then with 12 members), formed by Germany and its closest neighbors (France,
the Benelux, and Denmark), with much more highly correlated shocks than the Southern and
English-speaking peripheries. Peripheral regions make a monetary union more difficult to manage,
and stand to lose as regards cyclical adjustment mechanisms, since the larger core will in general
have a much stronger influence on the common monetary policy. Feldstein (2000) also stressed the
potential for political conflict arising from "a sustained period of high cyclical unemployment in
any country" (ibidem, p. 351). In normative terms, we therefore deem detrimental the existence
of clear-cut core-periphery dichotomies, especially if the same regions repeatedly find themselves
in a peripheral situation.
Cluster analysis can be used to identify core regions, as they present homogeneous charac-
teristics. A number of studies have applied different versions of this technique in the context
of OCA theory. For instance, Artis and Zhang (2001), using data for the 1979-1995 period and
performing hard clustering, analyze (in)homogeneities among European countries, defining Ger-
many as the core country, and Canada, the United States, and Japan as controls. They identify
a cluster strongly connected to Germany (France, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands) and
two peripheries: a Northern group and a Southern group. In related work, the same authors (Ar-
tis and Zhang, 2002) employ fuzzy clustering to test on the EU-15 members (bar Luxembourg)
the OCA criteria and the Maastricht criteria. The same core cluster emerges (Germany, France,
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria), as well as two sets of peripheral countries. Crowley
(2008) uses model-based clustering (a maximum likelihood-based technique) in a sample of 32
countries (all European except the USA, Canada, and Japan) for the 1970-2005 period. National
(dis)similarities are assessed not only with reference to Germany but also relative to euro area
variables. The author finds some evidence of a geographical core-periphery pattern, where con-
tiguous countries in the centre of Europe tend to cluster together. Boreiko (2003) uses fuzzy
clustering to study the readiness of Central and Eastern European countries for EMU member-
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ship, whereas Tsangarides and Qureshi (2006) employ hard and fuzzy clustering techniques to
evaluate the suitability of monetary integration arrangements involving West African countries.
In this paper we perform a rolling window analysis of pairwise cyclical correlations in each
of the three monetary unions considered (Europe, Canada, and the USA). We compare average
bilateral correlations across unions and across subsamples, checking whether some trends suggested
by graphical rolling window representations are validated through formal statistical tests. We then
turn to the core-periphery issue, and apply fuzzy clustering techniques also in a rolling window
way (i.e., taking a succession of overlapping subsamples of fixed length). Hence we can study how
core-periphery patterns evolve over time, and how the three currency areas compare on this count.
We also compute a summary indicator of how entrenched peripheral status is. As it will turn out,
the EU-15 countries (and the subset sharing the euro) fare well in the comparison with American
or Canadian regions, in contrast to the unfavorable results vis-à-vis the USA often found in the
literature.
Our study adds to previous work on three main counts. First, we have a wider and longer
sample, covering three monetary unions and starting in 1950. Further, our treatment of deflators
to derive real variables is more careful, in an attempt to minimize measurement error. This yields
a broader perspective on cyclical patterns and more reliable statistical inference. Second, we
compare core-periphery patterns in the three currency areas, and study their evolution over time.
Finally, we make a novel application of the most prominent fuzzy clustering algorithm, forming
clusters on the basis of the full matrix of bilateral cyclical correlations and thus allowing the core
to be determined endogenously, instead of positing ex-ante that a certain region (say, Germany,
as regards Europe) plays an anchor role.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe our dataset,
providing details on the construction of some variables. In section 3 we analyze the behavior of
bilateral output gap correlations in each monetary union, both using rolling windows and testing
for the significance of differences between unions and between subsamples. Section 4 is devoted
to the analysis of core-periphery patterns through fuzzy clustering. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
For the three monetary unions under analysis, our sample runs from 1950 to 2005. This section
briefly describes the territorial units and measures of aggregate economic activity considered. Ap-
pendix A provides details about data sources and the construction of regional deflators. Appendix
B lists the regions of each monetary union and their relative economic weight.
In Canada available data is provincial personal income at current prices. The country is
composed of ten provinces and three territories, though the latter have been excluded from the
analysis. Their weight in Canada is residual, so the loss of this data is negligible.
In the case of the 50 USA States and the Washington District of Columbia (DC), available
data is also for personal income at current prices. Besides analyzing business cycles at state level,
we also consider a higher level of aggregation, collecting states into 9 Census regions (Table B3,
Appendix B).
In both North American monetary unions we deflate personal income using consumer price
indices (CPI). An original feature of our work is that we have constructed CPI series for each
territorial unit (see Appendix A), rather than using a single, national-wide deflator for all provinces
or states, as common in the literature.
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For the European Union we use gross domestic product at 2000 prices. We analyze the pre-
2004 member countries (EU-15) and also the euro area subset (EU-12, thus excluding Denmark,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
We resort to personal income as a proxy for output for the regions of the USA and Canada
in order to have the longest possible sample in these monetary unions. In the USA data for
nominal Gross State Product (GSP) is only available from 1963, and the corresponding state-
specific deflators do not exist before 1990. As for Canada, Gross Provincial Product (GPP) series
only start in 1981. Due to these limitations, personal income is often used in the literature to
study business cycle volatility and synchronization (e.g. Carlino and Sill, 2000; Karras, 2003).
The variable used throughout in the analysis is the annual output gap, defined as log actual
output minus log potential output. To detrend the data we have resorted to two widely used
methods, both with standard parameter values: the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with λ = 100,
and the Baxter and King (BK) band-pass filter with L = 2, H = 8, and K = 3. For conciseness,
results presented in the main text are for the HP filter, whereas those obtained with the BK filter
are reported in Appendix C.
3 Business Cycle Synchronization
3.1 Overview and Methodology
To study the dynamics of the output gap correlations between regions in each monetary union, we
first perform a rolling windows analysis. We set a fixed window length of ten years, in line with the
average duration of a complete business cycle.2 The window is then successively moved forward
by an increment of one year (i.e., first the 1950-1959 period, then 1951-1960, and so forth).3
In each window and for each monetary union, we compute the matrix of bilateral output gap
correlation coefficients. For Z regions there will be Z(Z−1)2 different pairwise correlations, which
we summarize by their average and standard deviation, both for the HP and BK filters.
We then assess the statistical significance of the trends suggested by the rolling windows analy-
sis, both as regards differences between monetary unions and between subsamples. As previous
studies have done - e.g. Wynne and Koo (2000), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), and Beine and
Coulombe (2003) - we estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the bilateral correlation coeffi-
cients by the generalized method of moments (GMM). More specifically, we compute Newey-West
standard errors and covariances.
For each monetary union, we divide the full sample in two halves (1950-1977 and 1978-2005)
and report individual bilateral correlation coefficients and their standard deviations. Further, we
test whether the average pairwise correlation changes significantly from the first to the second
half. Last but not least, it is also assessed if there is a significant difference in average bilateral
correlations between each pair of monetary unions - what Clark and van Wincoop (2001) called
the border effect in their Europe versus USA comparison. This exercise is performed for the full
sample, as well as for subsamples that drop older observations.
3.2 Rolling Windows Results
In this section we present and discuss the rolling window evolution of the bilateral correlations’
average and standard deviation for the three monetary unions. Each figure compares Europe
2See e.g. Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005) or the seminal work of Burns and Mitchell (1946).
3Notice, however, that the computation of the output gap was performed only once, using the full sample.
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(both EU-15 and EU-12) with one of the other two currency areas, with the mid (5th) year of





















































































































Figure 2 - Standard Deviation of Bilateral Correlations for the EU and Canada (10-year rolling
windows)
Figure 1 presents average bilateral correlations for the EU-15, EU-12, and Canada. Until the
70s correlations were somewhat higher in Canada, the opposite taking place towards the end of
the sample, due to a clear upward trend in European average correlations. Results for the EU-15
and EU-12 are very similar, with the exception of the windows corresponding to the 80s and 90s,
when average synchronization in the euro area was slightly higher than in the EU-15. Standard
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Figure 4 - Standard Deviation of Bilateral Correlations for the EU and the USA (10-year rolling
windows)
Figures 3 and 4 compare Europe with the USA, the latter considered at the level of states and
Census regions. Average bilateral correlations for these two levels of aggregation show broadly
similar trends, but cyclical synchronization is systematically higher for the 9 Census regions (Figure
3). Correspondingly, standard deviations are generally larger at state level (Figure 4). This points
to the fact that different levels of aggregation can lead to different results.4 Standard deviations
4The work by Clark and van Wincoop (2001) already mentioned this fact, taking it into consideration when
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for the 9 Census regions tend to decline over time.
While until the late 70s European average correlations were only comparable to (or even fell
short of) those of the USA states, towards the end of the sample they become much closer to
those of the Census regions.
Results obtained with the BK filter (Appendix C, Figures C1-C4) broadly confirm the above
HP-based conclusions.5
3.3 Subsamples and Statistical Significance
In this section we report results for the statistical significance of individual bilateral correlation
coefficients and their averages in the two halves of the full sample: 1950-1977 and 1978-2005. The
upper panel of each table refers to the former period, while the lower panel shows results for the
latter; numbers in parenthesis are GMM-estimated Newey-West standard errors.
Table 1 - Business Cycle Correlations for the Canadian Provinces
ALB BC MAN NB NFD NS ONT PEI QUE SAS
Alberta (ALB)
British Columbia (BC) 0.46***
(0.08)
Manitoba (MAN) 0.62*** 0.63***
(0.09) (0.1)
New Brunswick (NB) 0.29* 0.74*** 0.67***
(0.16) (0.07) (0.08)
New Foundland and Labrador (NFD 0.05 0.67*** 0.31* 0.71***
(0.16) (0.07) (0.19) (0.12)
Nova Scotia (NS) 0.25* 0.79*** 0.65*** 0.75*** 0.79***
(0.14) (0.05) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08)
Ontario (ONT) 0.37*** 0.86*** 0.66*** 0.77*** 0.71*** 0.81***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
Prince Edward Island (PEI) 0.46*** 0.30* 0.50*** 0.41** 0.15 0.24 0.25
(0.11) (0.17) (0.13) (0.18) (0.22) (0.20) (0.16)
Quebec (QUE) 0.37*** 0.77*** 0.53*** 0.76*** 0.86*** 0.83*** 0.77*** 0.35**
(0.12) (0.05) (0.1) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.17)
Saskatchewan (SAS) 0.74*** 0.24 0.58*** 0.25 0.01 0.14 0.22 0.58*** 0.26*
(0.1) (0.17) (0.12) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.16) (0.09) (0.15)
ALB BC MAN NB NFD NS ONT PEI QUE SAS
Alberta (ALB)
British Columbia (BC) 0.62***
(0.11)
Manitoba (MAN) 0.08 -0.01
(0.16) (0.25)
New Brunswick (NB) 0.11 0.33 0.61***
(0.15) (0.23) (0.17)
New Foundland and Labrador (NFD -0.01 0.46** 0.21 0.50***
(0.12) (0.21) (0.22) (0.17)
Nova Scotia (NS) 0.08 0.12 0.76*** 0.85*** 0.44**
(0.22) (0.23) (0.07) (0.07) (0.17)
Ontario (ONT) 0.03 0.31 0.61*** 0.79*** 0.55*** 0.85***
(0.24) (0.20) (0.13) (0.07) (0.16) (0.06)
Prince Edward Island (PEI) -0.15 0.19 0.31 0.78*** 0.54*** 0.70*** 0.79***
(0.22) (0.25) (0.20) (0.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.06)
Quebec (QUE) 0.20 0.62*** 0.36 0.55*** 0.70*** 0.57*** 0.79*** 0.65***
(0.15) (0.1) (0.26) (0.16) (0.11) (0.18) (0.08) (0.08)
Saskatchewan (SAS) 0.43** 0.22 0.50*** 0.34*** -0.06 0.26* 0.05 -0.01 -0.04
(0.21) (0.21) (0.12) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18) (0.23) (0.17)
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
1950 - 1977
1978-2005
Comparing the upper and lower panels of Table 1, we see that bilateral correlations tend to
be lower and less significant in the second half of the sample. This decline is particularly visible
making comparisons with the European Union. The authors use the 9 Census regions instead of the states, due to
significantly different geographic and economic dimensions.
5Given the values chosen for the BK filter parameters we lose three years of data at the beginning and at the
end of the sample.
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in the correlations regarding the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and Manitoba. Most
Saskatchewan coefficients were not significant in either period.
Table 2 - Business Cycle Correlations for the 9 USA Census Regions
NENG MATL ENC WNC SATL ESC WSC MTN PAC
New England (NENG)
Middle Atlantic (MATL) 0.82***
(0.04)
East North Central (ENC) 0.62*** 0.45***
(0.12) (0.15)
West North Central (WNC) 0.09 0.43** 0.03
(0.21) (0.20) (0.27)
South Atlantic (SATL) 0.56*** 0.37* 0.90*** 0.14
(0.18) (0.21) (0.01) (0.25)
East South Central (ESC) 0.80*** 0.67*** 0.82*** 0.27 0.84***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.23) (0.05)
West South Central (WSC) 0.70*** 0.78*** 0.70*** 0.56** 0.73*** 0.84***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.22) (0.07) (0.04)
Mountain (MTN) 0.40*** 0.63*** 0.25* 0.58*** 0.23 0.32** 0.63***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.18) (0.20) (0.16) (0.15)
Pacific (PAC) 0.61*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.51** 0.66*** 0.78*** 0.85*** 0.60***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.24) (0.10) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16)
NENG MATL ENC WNC SATL ESC WSC MTN PAC
New England (NENG)
Middle Atlantic (MATL) 0.90***
(0.05)
East North Central (ENC) 0.66*** 0.39***
(0.07) (0.10)
West North Central (WNC) 0.68*** 0.57*** 0.69***
(0.07) (0.11) (0.11)
South Atlantic (SATL) 0.63*** 0.34*** 0.94*** 0.69***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.01) (0.12)
East South Central (ESC) 0.76*** 0.56*** 0.95*** 0.77*** 0.85***
(0.06) (0.12) (0.01) (0.09) (0.04)
West South Central (WSC) 0.80*** 0.61*** 0.88*** 0.57*** 0.82*** 0.88***
(0.07) (0.14) (0.04) (0.12) (0.05) (0.01)
Mountain (MTN) 0.93*** 0.81*** 0.68*** 0.74*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 0.78***
(0.01) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.09)
Pacific (PAC) 0.39*** 0.20** 0.71*** 0.79*** 0.64*** 0.68*** 0.42*** 0.55***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09)
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
1950 - 1977
1978 - 2005
In the case of the 9 USA Census regions (Table 2), pairwise correlations are usually high and
significant in both periods. The few exceptions mainly concern the West North Central region in
the first half of the sample.6
6We were unable to estimate standard errors for correlations between USA states: 51 territorial units trans-
late into a vector of 1275 pairwise correlation coefficients, whose variance-covariance matrix has 813450 different
elements. However, the correlation coefficients themselves are available upon request.
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Table 3 - Business Cycle Correlations for the EU-15 Member Countries




Finland (FIN) 0.41*** 0.65***
(0.15) (0.13)
France (FR) 0.56*** 0.63*** 0.35**
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18)
Germany (DE) 0.74*** 0.50*** 0.42*** 0.65***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.15) (0.14)
Greece (EL) 0.08 0.16 -0.01 0.15 0.20
(0.13) (0.15) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20)
Ireland (IE) 0.36*** 0.62*** 0.50*** 0.37* 0.49*** -0.09
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.21) (0.09) (0.18)
Italy (IT) 0.34** 0.43*** 0.41** 0.43*** 0.34** -0.25* 0.67***
(0.13) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10)
Luxembourg (LU) 0.34** 0.50*** 0.34 0.42** 0.38** 0.27 0.13 0.05
(0.16) (0.19) (0.24) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20)
Netherlands (NL) 0.28** 0.56*** 0.25 0.09 0.28 0.20 0.32** 0.08 0.28***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.22) (0.30) (0.19) (0.14) (0.16) (0.21) (0.11)
Portugal (PT) 0.17 0.59*** 0.44*** 0.38* 0.28 0.30 0.52*** 0.47*** 0.40 0.25
(0.22) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.10) (0.13) (0.29) (0.15)
Spain (ES) 0.13 0.60*** 0.53*** 0.28 -0.07 0.10 0.27* 0.22 0.14 0.14 0.43***
(0.24) (0.15) (0.11) (0.22) (0.16) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.25) (0.24) (0.12)
Denmark (DK) 0.37** 0.38*** 0.18 0.38** 0.42** 0.05 0.46*** 0.41** 0.27* 0.25 0.23 -0.15
(01.7) (0.15) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.26) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21)
Sweden (SE) 0.15 0.64*** 0.42*** 0.23 0.07 -0.01 0.31 0.16 0.20 0.39*** 0.01 0.32* 0.31
(0.12) (0.10) (0.15) (0.20) (0.19) (0.16) (0.23) (0.23) (0.13) (0.10) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21)
United Kingdom (UK) 0.15 0.64*** 0.44*** 0.14 0.19 0.40** 0.46*** 0.18 0.36 0.50*** 0.71*** 0.39*** 0.26 0.33**
(0.18) (0.11) (0.17) (0.28) (0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.20) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.13)




Finland (FIN) 0.08 0.36**
(0.15) (0.14)
France (FR) 0.68*** 0.82*** 0.54***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.14)
Germany (DE) 0.83*** 0.79*** -0.18* 0.57***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10)
Greece (EL) 0.51*** 0.67*** 0.04 0.50*** 0.69***
(0.14) (0.09) (0.18) (0.10) (0.11)
Ireland (IE) 0.41** 0.53*** 0.37 0.50*** 0.40** 0.48***
(0.17) (0.08) (0.25) (0.12) (0.19) (0.17)
Italy (IT) 0.63*** 0.88*** 0.53*** 0.79*** 0.65*** 0.61*** 0.58***
(0.09) (0.04) (0.14) (0.08) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
Luxembourg (LU) 0.69*** 0.76*** 0.25 0.79*** 0.70*** 0.49*** 0.30* 0.64***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.20) (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.12)
Netherlands (NL) 0.65*** 0.78*** 0.28* 0.69*** 0.74*** 0.58*** 0.66*** 0.75*** 0.81***
(0.10) (0.04) (0.15) (0.09) (0.07) (0.16) (0.13) (0.07) (0.06)
Portugal (PT) 0.67*** 0.83*** 0.38*** 0.80*** 0.61*** 0.41*** 0.52*** 0.78*** 0.65*** 0.62***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.13) (0.12)
Spain (ES) 0.58*** 0.82*** 0.43** 0.87*** 0.58*** 0.52*** 0.28** 0.73*** 0.84*** 0.69*** 0.75***
(0.15) (0.08) (0.19) (0.05) (0.15) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.05) (0.08) (0.12)
Denmark (DK) -0.03 0.02 0.33* 0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.44** -0.15 0.04
(0.26) (0.24) (0.18) (0.21) (0.24) (0.19) (0.26) (0.18) (0.25) (0.18) (0.20) (0.22)
Sweden (SE) 0.26 0.54*** 0.80*** 0.67*** 0.15 0.27 0.25 0.70*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.40*** 0.68*** 0.52***
(0.19) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.19) (0.17) (0.23) (0.10) (0.17) (0.14) (0.15) (0.11) (0.16)
United Kingdom (UK) 0.13 0.40*** 0.61*** 0.50*** 0.12 0.27 0.20 0.54*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 0.30* 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.81***
(0.20) (0.14) (0.18) (0.12) (0.23) (0.16) (0.22) (0.13) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.07)
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
1950 - 1977
1978 - 2005
Table 3 gives results for the EU-15. We can clearly see correlation coefficients increasing from
the first to the second half of the sample. In the first period, several countries - Greece, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom - often display low
correlations. Except for the Netherlands, these are countries having joined the European Union
in 1973 or later. In the second half, low and non-significant coefficients mainly involve Denmark
and, to a lesser extent, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. With the exception of Finland,
these are precisely the countries which do not belong to the euro area.
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Results for the BK band-pass filter (Appendix C, Tables C1-C3) are broadly consistent with
those above, though conclusions for specific regions change in a few instances. The main difference
relative to the HP filter is that in Europe the contrast between euro area economies and the three
nations retaining monetary sovereignty is less marked.
We also test whether the change in average bilateral correlations from the first to the second
half of the sample is statistically significant.7 Results in Table 4 broadly corroborate the trends
detected in the rolling windows analysis. In the 1978-2005 period cyclical synchronization in
Europe surpasses Canada’s and reduces the gap to USA Census regions. The increase relative to
the first subsample is large and significant, particularly among euro area economies. Changes in
North America are less marked and fail to reach statistical significance. BK-based results (Table
C4), however, are less conclusive, as the rise in European correlations fails to reach significance as
well.
Table 4 - Significance of Average Bilateral Correlations
Monetary Unions Canada EU-15 EU-12 USA-9 CR
1950− 1977
0.51∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
1978− 2005
0.39∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Change −0.12 0.18∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
3.4 Differences between Monetary Unions
We now compare average bilateral correlations across currency areas, testing for each pair of
monetary unions whether differences are significant. Table 5 reports these differences, and their
Newey-West standard errors, for the full sample, its second half, and its final third. The latter
corresponds to 19 observations, which still slightly exceeds the length of Clark and van Wincoop’s
(2001) subsamples when addressing a similar issue.8
7Unlike in Clark and van Wincoop (2001), our tests do not assume independence of coefficients between sub-
samples.
8Following their approach, the variance-covariance matrix for the coefficients in the two unions being compared
is estimated using the full sample, and retained when analyzing shorter periods, normalizing by the number of
observations in each case.
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Table 5 - Average Bilateral Correlations: Comparing Monetary Unions
1950− 2005
USA-9 CR EU-15 EU-12
CAN −0.17∗∗ 0.07 0.03
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
USA-9 CR 0.24∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
1978− 2005
USA-9 CR EU-15 EU-12
CAN −0.30∗∗∗ −0.11 −0.20∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10)
USA-9 CR 0.18∗∗∗ 0.10
(0.07) (0.08)
1987− 2005
USA-9 CR EU-15 EU-12
CAN −0.16 0.03 −0.08
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
USA-9 CR 0.19∗∗ 0.08
(0.08) (0.10)
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each entry is the difference
in average pairwise correlations between the union in row and the one in column.
The most noteworthy result of Table 5 is the fading away of the difference between the USA
Census regions and the euro area. It ceases to be significant in the final years, with both filters
(results for the BK filter are provided in Table C5). With HP-filtered data the same holds for the
whole of the 1978-2005 period; in this sample the comparison with Canada also becomes markedly
favorable to the euro countries (a "border effect" upside down, to borrow some terminology from
Clark and van Wincoop, 2001).
On the whole, our comparison of monetary unions turns out more favorable to Europe than
the studies surveyed in the introductory section had suggested.
4 Core-Periphery Patterns: A Fuzzy Cluster Analysis
4.1 Overview and Methodology
We now investigate whether there are subsets of regions in a given monetary union which display a
high internal degree of cyclical homogeneity, but tend to be less synchronized with outside regions.
If the homogeneous subset accounts for a major share of total output, it corresponds to a monetary
union "core" which will in general have a disproportionate influence on the common monetary
policy, to the detriment of smaller, peripheral regions. We wish to study (i) how prevalent are
core-periphery patterns in Europe, Canada, and the USA; (ii) whether such prevalence displays
any clear trend over time; and (iii) whether peripheral regions tend to be the same in different
subsamples, as opposed to a situation where, though a core might exist, its membership does not
remain unchanged.
To identify groups of regions we perform fuzzy clustering, which is more flexible and general
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than hard (or crisp) clustering since it does not impose that clusters are mutually exclusive, but
rather allows for intermediate degrees of membership. In keeping with section 3, we base our
analysis on the full matrix of bilateral output gap correlations - which is, to our knowledge, a
novel approach. One implication is that the core cluster is endogenously determined. As an
alternative, one may posit that a certain region plays an anchor role, and therefore always belongs
to the core (and indeed defines it), as other studies have done (e.g. Bayoumi and Eichengreen,
1993; Artis and Zhang, 2001, 2002). This assumption, however, may fail to be supported by
the data: for instance, we often find that in subsamples comprising the post-reunification years
Germany (the usual anchor region in Europe) actually belongs to a peripheral cluster.
We use the fuzzy C-means (FCM) algorithm, which is regarded as the most prominent method
among several existing alternatives.9 This algorithm is now briefly described, so as to show how
it can be applied to the matrix of bilateral correlations. For c clusters and N objects (regions of a
monetary union, in our case), the FCM algorithm yields a matrix U of Nc membership coefficients
(of each object to each cluster) which minimizes a sum of squared Euclidean distances between
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where the membership coefficients uik must verify the following constraints:
0 ≤ uik ≤ 1 (2)
cX
k=1





uik < N, 1 ≤ k ≤ c (4)
m denotes the number of variables used in the analysis (i.e., criteria to assess similarities and




























eliminating the reference to cluster centres and thus clarifying that the dissimilarity metric is the
9We use the MATLAB routines of Balasko et al. (2004), where one can also find a presentation of different
algorithms.
12
squared Euclidean distance between pairs of objects.
We wish to measure dissimilarity using one minus the correlation coefficient (1−r), rather than
the Euclidean distance. However, the two are related. Let bxit denote the output gap of region i
in period t, and xit its standardized version (obtained by subtracting the mean and dividing by
the standard deviation, both computed in a sample of T observations). It is straightforward that,
for regions i and j:
rij = corr(bxi, bxj) = corr(xi, xj) = cov(xi, xj) (7)
If one now computes the squared Euclidean distance between regions i and j on the basis of













x2jt = 2T (1− cov(xi, xj)) (8)
Hence
d2ij = 2T (1− rij) (9)
showing that the two dissimilarity metrics (d2 and 1− r) only differ by a multiplicative constant.
Therefore, the FCM algorithm is applied by regarding the standardized output gaps in a given
period as one of the m variables (we will have m = T ).
For consistency with section 3, we form clusters in a rolling window way, taking a succession
of overlapping subsamples of 10 years each (T = 10). In each subsample, the largest cluster in
economic terms is taken to be the core, the others being assimilated to peripheries; we compute
the economic size of a cluster by summing regional incomes weighted by membership coefficients.10
The column of matrix U containing the coefficients of the core cluster is retained, and used for
the computation of the summary statistics described below.
Let u∗i,sdenote the coefficient of membership to the core for region i (i = 1, ..., N) in window s.
Its standard deviation across i, σi(u∗i,s), yields, for each subsample, a measure of the dispersion
of the core membership coefficients. The higher this indicator, the easier it is to find clear-cut
clusters, and hence the sharper is the contrast between the core and the periphery(ies). Further,




i , which is a summary measure of region i belongingness to the








i ), indicates how unequal regions are in
terms of core membership; high values of this statistic suggest an entrenched core-periphery divide,
with regions tending to have permanently high, or permanently low, degrees of core membership.
An issue unaddressed so far concerns the choice of c in equation (1). Several statistics (also
called validity measures) have been proposed in the literature to assess how well a given number
of clusters represent the data (see e.g. Balasko et al., 2004 or Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2006).
However, optimization of c based on any of those validity measures might pose a problem of
comparability between different monetary unions or different subsamples (since u∗i,s will on average
decrease with c). Hence, rather than optimizing c each time the fuzzy clustering algorithm is run,
we keep c constant across subsamples and monetary unions, and perform some sensitivity analysis
over its value. Bearing in mind that the number of regions is often limited (e.g. 10 Canadian
provinces or 9 USA Census regions), we consider the existence of 2, 3, or 4 clusters.
10More formally, for each cluster we take the respective column of matrix U , transpose it, and multiply it by a
column vector of average regional incomes in the sample period considered.
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4.2 Results
Figures 5 to 10 report indicator σi(u∗i,s) for different monetary unions and different choices of the
number of clusters. As before, each figure compares Europe with either Canada or the USA, the
horizontal axis contains the mid (5th) year of each window, and corresponding results for BK

























































Figure 5 - Regional Dispersion of Core Membership for the EU and Canada (2 clusters)
Note: This and the following figures depict, for each 10-year window, the summary statistic σi(u
∗
i,s), whose
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Figure 10 - Regional Dispersion of Core Membership for the EU and the USA (4 clusters)
Europe does not display a more intense core—periphery dichotomy than the North American
unions. For both European aggregates, the values of the chosen indicator are roughly in line with
those for USA states.11 ,12 The same holds for the comparison with Canada, though the latter tends
to have a more clear-cut core until the 70s. Further, with very few exceptions, the dispersion of
core membership is considerably lower in Europe than in the USA Census regions, where easily
identifiable core-periphery patterns are most prevalent.
11Throughout this section, results for the euro area (EU-12) are based on the coefficients (u∗i,s) obtained when
forming clusters in the EU-15 sample. An alternative would be to run the clustering algorithm for the 12 euro
countries alone. We have checked that results would not be greatly changed.
12This comparison should be regarded with some prudence, due to the very different number of territorial units
involved.
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The said exceptions pertain to the 80s and 90s, when Europe shows an increase in the core-
periphery contrast (especially under the assumption of two clusters), largely reversed in the very
final years of the sample. In contrast, throughout 1950-2005 core membership dispersion remains
high and fairly stable among USA Census regions. The reported statistic is more volatile in
USA states (where no overall trend emerges) and in Canada (where the long-run trend, when
discernible, is one of slight decline).
Results with BK-filtered data largely conform to the above paragraphs. The main differences
are that core membership dispersion in Europe is now generally lower than in Canada, higher
than among USA states, and with a more subdued rise in the 80s and 90s.




i ) in the different monetary




i can be found in Appendix D, or are available upon request in
the case of USA states). Values for Europe are consistently the lowest, suggesting, according to
the interpretation presented before, that entrenched core-periphery divides are less of a problem
in Europe than in North America. One remarks that the advantage (i.e., lower dispersion) of
Europe is clearer in Table 6 than in the previous figures, suggesting that in Europe not only is
the core-periphery contrast milder but also the core composition is more variable.
Table 6 - Regional Dispersion of Average Core Membership
c = 2 c = 3 c = 4
Canada 0.16 0.16 0.18
EU-15 0.11 0.09 0.10
EU-12 0.09 0.08 0.09
USA-9 CR 0.15 0.21 0.20
USA-States 0.16 0.13 0.12




i ), whose derivation is explained in the text.
As a whole, in the light of the preceding cluster analysis, Europe does not seem to fare any
worse than the time-honoured North American monetary unions, and can even be regarded as
outperforming them.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have compared the degree of business cycle synchronization and the prevalence
of core-periphery patterns in the European Union, Canada, and the USA. The territorial units
considered are 15 EU member countries (those prior to the 2004 enlargement), 10 Canadian
Provinces, and 50 USA states (plus Washington DC), which are alternatively aggregated into 9
Census regions. Results are also reported for the subset of EU-15 countries belonging to the euro
area. Our sample spans more than half a century (1950-2005), and this long time dimension is
exploited through rolling window analyses and formal statistical tests in and across subsamples.
Data preparation has also been more detailed than in previous studies, particularly as regards
the construction of individual deflators for the nominal income of each North American territorial
unit. Throughout we cross-check results obtained with two detrending methods, the HP and BK
filters.
Rolling window analysis suggests that cyclical correlations among European countries have
substantially risen over time, reaching levels close to the most demanding benchmark in North
America: the 9 USA Census regions. Both parts of this statement are corroborated by formal
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tests. Taking average pairwise correlations, the increase in the EU-15 from the first to the second
half of the full sample is statistically significant, whereas the difference between the 9 USA regions
and the euro area countries ceases to be so in subsamples excluding older observations. Clark and
van Wincoop’s (2001) border effect is therefore losing strength in the USA-euro area comparison.
We have applied fuzzy clustering to the analysis of core-periphery issues, working with the
full matrix of bilateral correlations rather than with pre-defined anchor areas, and taking rolling
window subsamples. The contrast between core and periphery(ies) in the EU-15 was strongest in
the 80s and 90s. Apart from these decades, the core-periphery divide is less marked in Europe than
in North America, especially when considering USA Census regions. Averaging across subsamples,
we also find that European countries are much more similar in their degree of core belongingness
than Canadian or USA territorial units. Our interpretation of this result is that in Europe the
composition of the core is more variable, and therefore peripheral regions tend not to be always
the same.
To sum up, our comparison exercise turns out clearly more favorable to Europe than what
is common in the literature. From the viewpoint adopted - cyclical developments in economic
activity, in line with the asymmetric shocks problem of OCA theory - Europe has developed into
a workable monetary union.
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6 Appendix A - Data Sources and Deflators
Canada - Provincial data for Canada is from Statistics of Canada, Historical Statistics and
Provincial Economic Accounts. Data is for Personal Income by Province at current prices. Data
for the period 1947-1996 was kindly supplied by Marc Tomljanovich, from DeJuan and Toml-
janovich (2005), and for 1996-2005 was taken from the “Provincial Economic Accounts, Selected
Indicators”, in the Statistics of Canada website (http://www.statcan.ca/start.html).13 Canada
has data available for Gross Provincial Product (GPP), but only for the period 1981-2005.
Provincial consumer price indices (CPI), used to deflate nominal personal income, are available
only between 1981 and 2005 and were taken from the Statistics of Canada website. For the rest of
the sample we use the CPI for regional cities (usually the capital of the province and/or its most
important city), obtained as follows: for the period 1947-1971 we use the historical data provided
by the Statistics of Canada, and for 1971-1981 we use data purchased from CANSIM, a data base
from the Statistics of Canada. For each province, we then build a CPI series for 1947-2005 by
applying the growth rates of the pre-1981 regional cities’ CPI to the levels of the data for the
provincial CPI.
Several details in the CPI series for the regional cities are worth noticing. The province of
Prince Edward Island did not have an index for any of its cities; hence, between 1947 and 1980 we
have applied the growth rate of the CPI of Montreal (in Quebec, the nearest province). For the
province of Newfoundland and Labrador (which joined the Canadian Federation in 1949), the years
between 1949 and 1951 did not present data for St. John’s, its foremost city, so we have also used
the growth rates of Montreal’s CPI. Between 1971 and 1981, the data for the cities of Edmonton
and Calgary (province of Alberta) and Regina and Saskatoon (province of Saskatchewan) were
presented in separate indices, which was not the case in the historical data (1947-1971). In each
of these provinces we have built a single CPI series for 1971-1981 by taking a population-weighted
average of the CPI of the two cities.
13Though for most regions in the three monetary unions considered we have collected data from 1947 onwards,
the sample used in the empirical work only starts in 1950, the first year in which no territorial units have missing
values.
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We have not considered the territories of Nunavut, Yukon, and Northwestern, given that data
supplied by Marc Tomljanovich excluded these regions from the analysis. As can be seen from
Table B1, their economic importance is residual.
European Union - Gross Domestic Product at 2000 constant prices for the EU-15 was taken
from the Penn World Tables (PWT, version 6.2) for the 1950-2004 period. For 2005, not available
in the PWT, we applied the real GDP growth rates from AMECO (Annual Macro Economic
Database, European Commission). For the period between 1947 and 1950, also not available in
the PWT, we use the real GDP growth rates from Maddison (1989), except for Luxembourg,
which is not available there either. We also use growth rates from the Maddison database in two
other instances of PWT missing values, namely Germany from 1950 to 1970 and Greece in 1951.
United States - The base variable is Personal Income by State at current prices, taken from
the Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of
Commerce, for the years 1947 to 2005, except for Alaska and Hawaii, for which data is available
only from 1950. Nominal Gross State Product (GSP) is unavailable before 1963.
As state deflators were not available, we use the CPI of several cities in the USA, taken from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Whenever data is available for the CPI of a city belonging
to a given state, that specific CPI is used. If no such CPI exists, we use the CPI of the city located
in the nearest state. If data exists for a city of a given state, but only for part of the sample, we fill
in the missing years also with the growth rates of the CPI of the city located in the nearest state.
Between 1950 and 1997 prices in Washington City and in Baltimore was presented as two distinct
CPI, but afterwards as a single one; we have proceeded as in the cases of Edmonton-Calgary and
Regina-Saskatoon.
7 Appendix B - List of Regions
Table B1 - Provinces of Canada
Canadian Provinces Year of joining the Federation Economic Weight (2005)
Alberta (ALB) 1905 11.9%
British Columbia (BC) 1871 12.6%
Manitoba (MAN) 1870 3.2%
New Brunswick (NB) 1867 2.0%
New Foundland and Labrador (NFD) 1949 1.3%
Nova Scotia (NS) 1867 2.6%
Ontario (ONT) 1867 40.8%
Prince Edward Island (PEI) 1873 0.4%
Quebec (QUE) 1867 22.0%
Saskatchewan (SAS) 1905 2.7%





Table B2 - States of the USA
USA States Year of joining the Federation Economic Weight (2005)
Alabama (AL) 1819 1.3%
Alaska (AK) 1959 0.2%
Arizona (AZ) 1912 1.8%
Arkansas (AR) 1836 0.7%
California (CA) 1850 13.1%
Colorado (CO) 1876 1.7%
Connecticut (CT) 1788 1.6%
Delaware (DE) 1787 0.3%
District of Columbia (DC) 1790 0.3%
Florida (FL) 1845 5.8%
Georgia (GA) 1788 2.8%
Hawaii (HI) 1959 0.4%
Idaho (ID) 1890 0.4%
Illinois (IL) 1818 4.5%
Indiana (IN) 1816 1.9%
Iowa (IA) 1846 0.9%
Kansas (KS) 1861 0.9%
Kentucky (KY) 1792 1.2%
Louisiana (LA) 1812 1.1%
Maine (ME) 1820 0.4%
Maryland (MD) 1788 2.3%
Massachusetts (MA) 1788 2.8%
Michigan (MI) 1837 3.3%
Minnesota (MN) 1858 1.9%
Mississippi (MS) 1817 0.7%
Missouri (MO) 1821 1.8%
Montana (MT) 1889 0.3%
Nebraska (NE) 1867 0.6%
Nevada (NV) 1864 0.8%
New Hampshire (NH) 1788 0.5%
New Jersey (NJ) 1787 3.7%
New Mexico (NM) 1912 0.5%
New York (NY) 1788 7.6%
North Carolina (NC) 1789 2.6%
North Dakota (ND) 1889 0.2%
Ohio (OH) 1803 3.6%
Oklahoma (OK) 1907 1.0%
Oregon (OR) 1859 1.1%
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Table B2 - States of the USA (cont.)
USA States Year of joining the Federation Economic Weight (2005)
Pennsylvania (PA) 1787 4.2%
Rhode Island (RI) 1790 0.4%
South Carolina (SC) 1788 1.2%
South Dakota (SD) 1889 0.2%
Tennessee (TN) 1796 1.8%
Texas (TX) 1845 7.2%
Utah (UT) 1896 0.7%
Vermont (VT) 1791 0.2%
Virginia (VA) 1788 2.8%
Washington (WA) 1889 2.2%
West Virginia (WV) 1863 0.5%
Wisconsin (WI) 1848 1.8%
Wyoming (WY) 1890 0.2%
Source: USA Census Bureau
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Table B3 - Census Bureau Regions and Divisions
Region 1 - Northeast








Region 2 - Midwest









Region 3 - South
South Atlantic (SATL) East South Central (ESC) West South Central (WSC)
(18.8%) (5.2%) (11.2%)
Delaware Alabama Arkansas








Region 4 - West










Source: USA Census Bureau. For each region the table reports economic weight and comprised states.
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Table B4 - Member Countries of the EU-15
EU Members Year of Accession Economic Weight (2005)*
Austria (AT) 1995 2.4%
Belgium (BE) 1957 2.9%
Denmark (DK) 1973 1.6%
Finland (FIN) 1995 1.4%
France (FR) 1957 16.1%
Germany (DE) 1957 21.6%
Greece (EL) 1981 2.2%
Ireland (IE) 1973 1.4%
Italy (IT) 1957 14.0%
Luxembourg (LU) 1957 0.3%
Netherlands (NL) 1957 4.9%
Portugal (PT) 1986 1.8%
Spain (ES) 1986 10.1%
Sweden (SE) 1995 2.5%
United Kingdom (UK) 1973 16.8%
* Based on PPS-adjusted GDP (Source: AMECO - Annual Macro Economic
Database, European Commission, Spring 2007 release)
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Figure C4 - Standard Deviation of Bilateral Correlations for the EU and the USA (10-year
rolling windows)
Table C1 - Business Cycle Correlations for the Canadian Provinces (BK Filter)
ALB BC MAN NB NFD NS ONT PEI QUE SAS
Alberta (ALB)
British Columbia (BC) 0.57***
(0.15)
Manitoba (MAN) 0.71*** 0.50***
(0.10) (0.19)
New Brunswick (NB) 0.44*** 0.50*** 0.49***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
New Foundland and Labrador (NFD 0.20 0.41*** -0.06 0.37*
(0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.20)
Nova Scotia (NS) 0.32*** 0.62*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.43***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Ontario (ONT) 0.63*** 0.78*** 0.57*** 0.64*** 0.41** 0.55***
(0.15) (0.07) (0.14) (0.11) (0.18) (0.10)
Prince Edward Island (PEI) 0.49** 0.37** 0.49*** 0.55*** 0.08 0.18 0.29**
(0.20) (0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16) (0.14)
Quebec (QUE) 0.44*** 0.66*** 0.29* 0.55*** 0.72*** 0.59*** 0.76*** 0.26*
(0.14) (0.10) (0.15) (0.13) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.15)
Saskatchewan (SAS) 0.81*** 0.43** 0.75*** 0.43*** 0.01 0.22 0.54*** 0.34** 0.24*
(0.07) (0.19) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.13)
ALB BC MAN NB NFD NS ONT PEI QUE SAS
Alberta (ALB)
British Columbia (BC) 0.69***
(0.10)
Manitoba (MAN) 0.43*** 0.34*
(0.12) (0.20)
New Brunswick (NB) 0.24* 0.33* 0.53***
(0.14) (0.17) (0.19)
New Foundland and Labrador (NFD 0.27** 0.32 0.35* 0.64***
(0.14) (0.22) (0.21) (0.15)
Nova Scotia (NS) 0.33*** 0.22 0.69*** 0.77*** 0.57***
(0.13) (0.23) (0.10) (0.09) (0.17)
Ontario (ONT) 0.26* 0.50*** 0.40*** 0.59*** 0.40** 0.59***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14)
Prince Edward Island (PEI) -0.23 -0.07 -0.03 0.56*** 0.43*** 0.37* 0.46***
(0.19) (0.26) (0.24) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.15)
Quebec (QUE) 0.38*** 0.71*** 0.42* 0.29 0.36* 0.37 0.75*** 0.15
(0.09) (0.08) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.07) (0.22)
Saskatchewan (SAS) 0.47** 0.40* 0.57*** 0.48*** 0.25 0.39** 0.04 0.03 0.09
(0.23) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.21) (0.19) (0.14) (0.23) (0.17)




Table C2 - Business Cycle Correlations for the 9 USA Census Regions (BK Filter)
NENG MATL ENC WNC SATL ESC WSC MTN PAC
New England (NENG)
Middle Atlantic (MATL) 0.87***
(0.04)
East North Central (ENC) 0.86*** 0.78***
(0.05) (0.06)
West North Central (WNC) 0.61*** 0.74*** 0.65***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13)
South Atlantic (SATL) 0.80*** 0.72*** 0.90*** 0.67***
(0.09) (01.0) (0.03) (0.11)
East South Central (ESC) 0.85*** 0.82*** 0.88*** 0.74*** 0.91***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03)
West South Central (WSC) 0.86*** 0.91*** 0.87*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.91***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03)
Mountain (MTN) 0.52*** 0.60*** 0.49*** 0.63*** 0.48** 0.44** 0.61***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.17)
Pacific (PAC) 0.77*** 0.88*** 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.76*** 0.82*** 0.89*** 0.65***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.18)
NENG MATL ENC WNC SATL ESC WSC MTN PAC
New England (NENG)
Middle Atlantic (MATL) 0.93***
(0.03)
East North Central (ENC) 0.77*** 0.66***
(0.05) (0.08)
West North Central (WNC) 0.82*** 0.74*** 0.79***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08)
South Atlantic (SATL) 0.72*** 0.59*** 0.89*** 0.68***
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.13)
East South Central (ESC) 0.78*** 0.71*** 0.89*** 0.84*** 0.75***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
West South Central (WSC) 0.88*** 0.80*** 0.92*** 0.82*** 0.82*** 0.91***
(0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Mountain (MTN) 0.91*** 0.87*** 0.64*** 0.80*** 0.54*** 0.72*** 0.77***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.05) (0.09)
Pacific (PAC) 0.60*** 0.53*** 0.63*** 0.71*** 0.39** 0.55*** 0.57*** 0.67***
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12) (0.06) (0.18) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07)




Table C3 - Business Cycle Correlations for the EU-15 Member Countries (BK Filter)




Finland (FIN) 0.63*** 0.62***
(0.12) (0.12)
France (FR) 0.24 0.64*** 0.19
(0.23) (0.18) (0.20)
Germany (DE) 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.52** 0.46***
(0.07) (0.09) (0.16) (0.16)
Greece (EL) 0.07 0.12 -0.09 0.37*** 0.39**
(0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.19)
Ireland (IE) 0.26* 0.46*** 0.41** 0.10 0.43*** 0.01
(0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.25) (0.11) (0.19)
Italy (IT) 0.26 0.55*** 0.30 0.36* 0.22 -0.22* 0.50***
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.13) (0.09)
Luxembourg (LU) 0.28* 0.62*** 0.34** 0.70*** 0.54*** 0.27 0.35** 0.32
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.07) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19) (0.26)
Netherlands (NL) 0.52*** 0.73*** 0.60*** 0.40** 0.55*** -0.11 0.42*** 0.30 0.29**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.20) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12)
Portugal (PT) 0.38** 0.58*** 0.18 0.51** 0.44** 0.20 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.51** 0.40***
(0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.10) (0.16) (0.23) (0.10)
Spain (ES) 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.45*** 0.34* 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.31** 0.31 0.30** 0.29**
(0.16) (0.09) (0.15) (0.18) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.13) (0.14)
Denmark (DK) 0.18 0.44** 0.18 0.30 0.52** 0.30 0.33* 0.25 0.35** 0.32* 0.45*** -0.04
(0.20) (0.14) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.22) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.12)
Sweden (SE) -0.08 0.39** 0.43*** -0.10 -0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.24 -0.26* 0.10 0.08
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.17) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.20)
United Kingdom (UK) 0.40*** 0.64*** 0.38*** 0.32 0.59*** 0.33 0.61*** 0.37* 0.48*** 0.51*** 0.71*** 0.16 0.50*** 0.08
(0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.26) (0.12) (0.22) (0.07) (0.19) (0.16) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18)




Finland (FIN) 0.27** 0.55***
(0.11) (0.08)
France (FR) 0.56*** 0.68*** 0.51***
(0.11) (0.14) (0.13)
Germany (DE) 0.66*** 0.65*** 0.01 0.53***
(0.10) (0.08) (0.13) (0.15)
Greece (EL) 0.32 0.55*** 0.15 0.44*** 0.63***
(0.21) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11)
Ireland (IE) 0.29 0.53*** 0.38** 0.53*** 0.47*** 0.53***
(0.19) (0.11) (0.19) (0.11) (0.10) (0.14)
Italy (IT) 0.56*** 0.85*** 0.53*** 0.62*** 0.70*** 0.58*** 0.50***
(0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14)
Luxembourg (LU) 0.43*** 0.51*** 0.18 0.52*** 0.60*** 0.44*** 0.30** 0.37***
(0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12)
Netherlands (NL) 0.47*** 0.67*** 0.28** 0.56*** 0.79*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 0.66*** 0.71***
(0.18) (0.07) (0.12) (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08)
Portugal (PT) 0.36*** 0.53*** 0.41*** 0.63*** 0.27 0.09 0.31** 0.51*** 0.30* 0.26
(0.11) (0.14) (0.11) (0.08) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.21)
Spain (ES) 0.36* 0.75*** 0.48*** 0.80*** 0.53*** 0.33** 0.46*** 0.65*** 0.53*** 0.61*** 0.71***
(0.20) (0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Denmark (DK) 0.31* 0.27 0.12 0.32 0.45*** 0.38*** 0.22 0.40** 0.35* 0.52*** -0.10 0.11
(0.17) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.15) (0.14) (0.22) (0.17) (0.18) (0.11) (0.20) (0.24)
Sweden (SE) 0.48*** 0.70*** 0.71*** 0.64*** 0.45*** 0.30* 0.43** 0.79*** 0.36** 0.58*** 0.34** 0.60*** 0.53***
(0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.06) (0.18) (0.12) (0.17) (0.11) (0.17)
United Kingdom (UK) 0.16 0.24** 0.52*** 0.39*** 0.14 0.24 0.22 0.33*** 0.33** 0.36** 0.12 0.33* 0.50*** 0.54***
(0.20) (0.12) (0.20) (0.13) (0.27) (0.19) (0.20) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.17) (0.19) (0.09)




Table C4 - Significance of Average Bilateral Correlations (BK Filter)
Monetary Unions Canada EU-15 EU-12 USA-9 CR
1953− 1977
0.46∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06)
1978− 2002
0.38∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Change −0.08 0.12 0.12 0.01
(0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table C5 - Average Bilateral Correlations: Comparing Monetary Unions (BK Filter)
1953− 2002
USA-9 CR EU-15 EU-12
CAN −0.32∗∗∗ 0.05 0.02
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
USA-9 CR 0.37∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05)
1978− 2002
USA-9 CR EU-15 EU-12
CAN −0.36∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.12
(0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
USA-9 CR 0.29∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.07)
1986− 2002
USA-9 CR EU-15 EU-12
CAN −0.19∗ −0.02 −0.12
(0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
USA-9 CR 0.18∗∗ 0.08
(0.08) (0.08)
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Each entry is the difference



























































Figure C5 - Regional Dispersion of Core Membership for the EU and Canada (2 clusters)
Note: This and the following figures depict, for each 10-year window, the summary statistic σi(u
∗
i,s), whose
derivation is explained in the text. There are a few cases of very low dispersion, and indeed one window (1958-1967)
where the clustering algorithm, despite different initializations, always converged to virtually identical coefficients
for the 15 European countries. Excluding these "outlier" subsamples from the analysis would not change our
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EU-15 EU-12 USA-States USA-9 CR
Figure C10 - Regional Dispersion of Core Membership for the EU and the USA (4 clusters)
Table C6 - Regional Dispersion of Average Core Membership (BK Filter)
c = 2 c = 3 c = 4
Canada 0.10 0.15 0.18
EU-15 0.06 0.06 0.07
EU-12 0.07 0.05 0.07
USA-9 CR 0.15 0.13 0.13
USA-States 0.12 0.09 0.06




i ), whose derivation is explained in the main text.
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9 Appendix D - Further Results of Cluster Analysis
Table D1 - Average Core Membership: Canada
c = 2 c = 3 c = 4 c = 2 c = 3 c = 4
Alberta 0.31 0.22 0.16 0.45 0.22 0.15
British Columbia 0.50 0.40 0.33 0.55 0.41 0.35
Manitoba 0.55 0.34 0.23 0.43 0.22 0.21
New Brunswick 0.76 0.54 0.30 0.44 0.32 0.19
New Foundland and Lab. 0.64 0.38 0.18 0.48 0.33 0.15
Nova Scotia 0.77 0.54 0.41 0.50 0.29 0.26
Ontario 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.61 0.63
Pr. Edward Island 0.55 0.44 0.29 0.41 0.29 0.16
Quebec 0.61 0.45 0.38 0.68 0.64 0.59
Saskatchewan 0.36 0.16 0.07 0.38 0.15 0.08
HP filter BK filter




i , whose derivation is explained in the main
text.
Table D2 - Average Core Membership: USA Census Regions
c = 2 c = 3 c = 4 c = 2 c = 3 c = 4
East North Central 0.65 0.43 0.32 0.56 0.46 0.43
East South Central 0.56 0.26 0.20 0.53 0.42 0.29
Middle Atlantic 0.78 0.74 0.66 0.79 0.64 0.55
Mountain 0.35 0.17 0.09 0.47 0.25 0.18
New England 0.71 0.62 0.49 0.66 0.42 0.26
Pacific 0.81 0.75 0.63 0.72 0.56 0.40
South Atlantic 0.81 0.55 0.44 0.77 0.54 0.44
West North Central 0.46 0.22 0.14 0.28 0.24 0.19
West South Central 0.55 0.34 0.24 0.51 0.31 0.16
HP filter BK filter
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Table D3 - Average Core Membership: European Union
c = 2 c = 3 c = 4 c = 2 c = 3 c = 4
Austria 0.61 0.34 0.27 0.58 0.35 0.28
Belgium 0.64 0.47 0.40 0.51 0.37 0.27
Denmark 0.45 0.31 0.23 0.57 0.45 0.35
Finland 0.36 0.25 0.18 0.45 0.29 0.20
France 0.68 0.54 0.49 0.54 0.40 0.35
Germany 0.72 0.50 0.45 0.69 0.51 0.45
Greece 0.65 0.47 0.36 0.60 0.43 0.35
Ireland 0.56 0.33 0.24 0.51 0.34 0.24
Italy 0.59 0.40 0.31 0.45 0.35 0.25
Luxembourg 0.49 0.33 0.22 0.51 0.33 0.23
Netherlands 0.56 0.41 0.27 0.57 0.33 0.26
Portugal 0.64 0.38 0.30 0.49 0.31 0.21
Spain 0.54 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.36 0.30
Sweden 0.36 0.25 0.18 0.47 0.29 0.20
United Kingdom 0.36 0.25 0.16 0.52 0.36 0.22
HP filter BK filter
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